Predictability for Privacy in Data Driven Government by Blanke, Jordan & Hiller, Janine
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 
Volume 20 Issue 1 Article 3 
1-6-2019 
Predictability for Privacy in Data Driven Government 
Jordan Blanke 
Mercer University 
Janine Hiller 
Virginia Tech 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jordan Blanke & Janine Hiller, Predictability for Privacy in Data Driven Government, 20 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 32 (2018). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol20/iss1/3 
The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the 
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing. 
	 32 
 
Predictability for Privacy in Data Driven 
Government 
Jordan M. Blanke* and Janine S. Hiller† 
Abstract 
The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program 
(DACA) required individuals to provide a great deal of personal 
information in order to participate and remain in the United 
States legally; could information in the same system now be 
used for deportations? More broadly, how should systems of 
data that are created legitimately by United States agencies 
and compiled for one reason, be used for other reasons? The 
increasing emphasis on “smart cities” that use data to 
efficiently provide and plan for service delivery will require the 
integration of data from multiple government and non-
government sources, in ways that citizens may not expect. 
There are increasing calls for the federal government to open 
up and share the data collected for one reason for use in 
additional, unrelated ways, and to combine that data with data 
collected by commercial, private entities. Systems design for 
enabling citizen privacy is essential for a foundation of trust 
between public agencies and citizens. For example, the Census 
Bureau is beginning to take additional steps to protect the 
facially anonymous statistics that it releases, due to concerns 
that individuals may be identified by increasingly sophisticated 
technical means that link data to persons. To address privacy 
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in fast growing and evolving government information systems, 
the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) 
proposes a systems approach to protect the privacy of 
personally identifiable information held by federal agencies. It 
adopts a privacy engineering and risk management approach 
with three privacy engineering objectives: predictability, 
manageability, and disassociability. Because of its fundamental 
importance to the effective protection of privacy, this article 
focuses on the first privacy engineering objective: 
predictability. Predictability is not an established term in the 
privacy literature. Therefore, this article analyzes the concept 
of predictability, what it may mean and how it may evolve, and 
then analyzes it by means of established legal concepts. 
Nonobviousness in patent law and the reasonable expectation 
standard in privacy jurisprudence provide lessons for the 
creation and maintenance of more trustworthy systems and the 
protection of citizen privacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program 
(DACA) required individuals to provide a great deal of personal 
information in order to participate and remain in the United 
States legally; could information in the same system now be 
used for deportations?1 More broadly, how should systems of 
data that are created legitimately by United States agencies 
and compiled for one reason, be used for other reasons? Data 
collected by local governments in order to provide services, such 
as water and sewer, might be useful for predicting family 
growth and school populations, for example. The increasing 
emphasis on “smart cities” that use data to efficiently provide 
and plan for service delivery will require the integration of data 
from multiple government and non-government sources, in 
ways that citizens may not expect.2 Furthermore, there are 
increasing calls for the federal government to open up data 
collected for one reason for use in additional, unrelated ways, 
and to combine that data with data collected by commercial, 
private entities.3 Though well-defined data can beneficially 
inform decision making, without updated, intentional, 
integrated protections, citizens’ privacy may be the victim. 
Certainly, data breaches are a concern, but those are not the 
only threats to privacy as “there is increasing use of 
government statistical data by private organizations that seek 
to link data collected for statistical purposes with identifiable 
individuals.”4 Indeed, the Census Bureau is beginning to take 
additional steps to protect the facially anonymous statistics 
that it releases, due to concerns that individuals may be 
                                                            
 1. See Caitlin Dickson, ‘DREAMers’ Gave Up Their Personal Info for 
DACA. They Wonder, Will the U.S. Use It to Deport Them? YAHOO NEWS (Sept. 
7, 2017), https://www.yahoo.com/news/dreamers-gave-personal-data-daca-now-
wonder-will-u-s-use-deport-204512167.html. 
 2. See Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: 
Protecting Privacy in a Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581 
(2014); Janine S. Hiller & Jordan M. Blanke, Smart Cities, Big Data, and the 
Resilience of Privacy, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 309 (2017). 
 3. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING AND MEDICINE, 
INNOVATIONS IN FEDERAL STATISTICS: COMBINING DATA SOURCES WHILE 
PROTECTING PRIVACY 11 [hereinafter INNOVATIONS IN FEDERAL STATISTICS] 
(Robert M. Groves and Brian A. Harris-Kojetin, Eds., 2017) (making it clear, 
however, that statistical uses should not identify individuals and that privacy 
protections are essential); COMMISSION ON EVIDENCE BASED POLICY MAKING, 
THE PROMISE OF EVIDENCE BASED POLICY-MAKING (2017). 
 4. See INNOVATIONS IN FEDERAL STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 74. 
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identified by increasingly sophisticated technical means that 
link data to persons.5 
To address privacy in fast growing and evolving 
government information systems, the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (NIST) proposes a systems approach 
to protect the privacy of personally identifiable information 
held by federal agencies (the “Privacy Framework”). It adopts a 
privacy engineering and risk management approach, 
introducing two important components: privacy engineering 
objectives and a privacy risk model. The three privacy 
engineering objectives proposed in the Privacy Framework are 
predictability, manageability, and disassociability. 
Because of its fundamental importance to the effective 
protection of privacy, this article focuses on the first privacy 
engineering objective: predictability. Systems design for 
enabling citizen privacy is based on a foundation of trust 
between public agencies and citizens, and NIST identified 
predictability as one of the building blocks. But when is a 
system predictable? And who decides when it meets that 
objective? Predictability is not an established term in the 
privacy literature. Therefore, this article analyzes the concept 
of predictability, what it may mean and how it may evolve, and 
then analyzes it by means of established legal concepts. 
Administrators who apply a predictability objective to systems 
of information can learn from lessons found in patent law and 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and as a result create more 
trustworthy systems. 
The article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the 
fundamental background of privacy principles and their 
relationship to federal policies about data systems. Part II 
describes the development of and relationship between the 
Cybersecurity Framework and the Privacy Framework. Part III 
focuses on understanding the building block of predictability, 
examining its meaning and comparing it to analogous concepts 
that are found in patent law nonobviousness and reasonable 
expectation jurisprudence. In an era of increased pressure on 
government agencies to make the information in their systems 
widely available, the Conclusion proposes that agencies should 
consider whether the gap between old and potentially new uses 
of data is too wide, whether there is hindsight bias in risk 
                                                            
 5. Id. at 75. 
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assessments, and if the very analysis that they perform is 
diminishing the assumptions that there is some personal 
information that should remain private. 
I. INFORMATION SYSTEM PRIVACY AND 
GOVERNMENT POLICY 
Fair Information Privacy Practices, in one form or another, 
are foundational principles for privacy protection around the 
globe, and rules and policies are primary sources for 
management of information in the government. The NIST 
Privacy Framework, privacy objectives, and government policy, 
refer to and implement many of these practices. 
A. FAIR INFORMATION PRIVACY PRACTICES 
In 1973 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
produced a document, Records, Computer, and the Rights of 
Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on 
Automated Personal Data Systems, that would become the 
basis for much of modern information privacy theory.6 The 
report, which was initially called the Code of Fair Information 
Practices, but has become more widely known as the Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), listed five principles: 
• There must be no personal data record-keeping systems 
whose very existence is secret. 
• There must be a way for an individual to find out what 
information about him is in a record and how it is used. 
• There must be a way for an individual to prevent 
information about him that was obtained for one purpose 
from being used or made available for other purposes 
without his consent. 
• There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a 
record of identifiable information about him. 
• Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or 
disseminating records of identifiable personal data must 
assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and 
must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.7 
These five principles have been the basis for most 
subsequent guidelines regarding informational privacy and 
data protection. In 1980, the Organization of Economic 
                                                            
 6. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, 
AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 41–42 (1973). 
 7. Id. 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) produced another 
influential and slightly expanded enumeration of these 
principles in its Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (the “OECD Guidelines”).8 
The basic principles are: Collection Limitation, Data Quality, 
Purpose Specification, Use Limitation, Security Safeguards, 
Openness, Individual Participation, and Accountability.9 
                                                            
 8. Org. of Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], The OECD Privacy 
Framework, at 3 (2013). 
 9. The OECD principles are, in full: 
Collection Limitation Principle 
7. There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such 
data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where 
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject. 
Data Quality Principle 
8. Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to 
be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be 
accurate, complete and kept up-to-date. 
Purpose Specification Principle 
9. The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified 
not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use 
limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not 
incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion 
of change of purpose. 
Use Limitation Principle 
10. Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise 
used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with 
Paragraph 9 except: 
a) with the consent of the data subject; or 
b) by the authority of law. 
Security Safeguards Principle 
11. Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards 
against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use, 
modification or disclosure of data. 
Openness Principle 
12. There should be a general policy of openness about developments, 
practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be 
readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal 
data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and 
usual residence of the data controller. 
Individual Participation Principle 
13. Individuals should have the right: 
a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of 
whether or not the data controller has data relating to them; 
b) to have communicated to them, data relating to them 
i. within a reasonable time; 
ii. at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; 
iii. in a reasonable manner; and 
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The OECD Guidelines were a primary source for the 
development of the European Data Directive of 199510 and the 
newly enacted General Data Protection Regulation11 (which 
became effective in May 2018). They are also largely the basis 
for the current iteration of FIPPs adopted by many federal 
agencies and incorporated into the Office of Management 
Budget’s very important 2016 revision. 
B.  FEDERAL RULES AND POLICIES 
The requirements of the Office of Management and 
Budget’s updated Circular A-130 (A-130) “apply to the 
information resources management activities of all agencies of 
the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.”12 Among the 
most important basic principles stated in the document are: 
Government agencies shall be open, transparent, and accountable to 
the public. 
Protecting an individual’s privacy is of utmost importance. The 
Federal Government shall consider and protect an individual’s 
privacy throughout the information life cycle. 
While security and privacy are independent and separate disciplines, 
they are closely related. 
The design of information collections shall be consistent with the 
intended use of the information, and the need for new information 
shall be balanced against the burden imposed on the public, the cost 
of the collection, and any privacy risks.13 
                                                            
iv. in a form that is readily intelligible to them; 
c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and 
(b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and 
d) to challenge data relating to them and, if the challenge is 
successful to have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended. 
Accountability Principle 
14. A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures 
which give effect to the principles stated above. Id. at 14–15. 
 10. Directive 95/46, on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) (EC). 
 11. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2016:119:FULL&from=EN 
[https://perma.cc/ENB6-HFWK]. 
 12. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-130 (2016), 
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/a130revised.pdf. 
 13. Id. at 3–4. 
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A-130 also sets a number of policy goals for agencies that 
need to be “specific, verifiable, and measurable, so that 
progress against these goals can be tracked.”14 Regarding 
inventories of data, agencies shall 
Maintain an inventory of the agency’s information systems that 
create, collect, use, process, store, maintain, disseminate, disclose, or 
dispose of PII to allow the agency to regularly review its PII and 
ensure, to the extent reasonably practicable, that such PII is 
accurate, relevant, timely, and complete; and to allow the agency to 
reduce its PII to the minimum necessary for the proper performance 
of authorized agency functions.15 
With regard to governance, agencies must “[r]equire that 
information security and privacy be fully integrated into the 
system development process.”16 With regard to information 
management and access, agencies must incorporate into their 
planning, budgeting, governance, and other policies, that 
“[f]ederal information is properly managed throughout its life 
cycle, including . . . creation, use, processing, storage, 
maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposition.”17 
Agencies must also ensure that “[f]ederal information and 
information systems are managed in a manner that identifies 
and mitigates privacy and security risks.”18 
An entire section of A-130 is devoted to Privacy and 
Information Security. In the subsection pertaining to privacy, 
agencies are directed to 
Establish and maintain a comprehensive privacy program that 
ensures compliance with applicable privacy requirements, develops 
and evaluates privacy policy, and manages privacy risks; 
Limit the creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, 
dissemination, and disclosure of PII to that which is legally 
authorized, relevant, and reasonably deemed necessary for the proper 
performance of agency functions; 
To the extent reasonably practicable, ensure that PII is accurate, 
relevant, timely, and complete, and reduce all PII to the minimum 
necessary for the proper performance of authorized agency functions; 
                                                            
 14. Id. at 5. 
 15. Id. A-130 provides that “‘[p]ersonally identifiable information’ means 
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, 
either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or 
linkable to a specific individual.” Id. at 33. 
 16. Id. at 9. 
 17. Id. at 14. 
 18. Id. 
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Take steps to eliminate unnecessary collection, maintenance, and use 
of Social Security numbers, and explore alternatives to the use of 
Social Security numbers as a personal identifier; 
Conduct privacy impact assessments when developing, procuring, or 
using IT; and 
Maintain and post privacy policies on all agency websites, mobile 
applications, and other digital services, in accordance with the E-
Government Act and OMB policy.19 
With regard to Information Security, A-130 mandates that 
agencies implement standards and guidelines contained in 
NIST Interagency or Internal Reports (NISTIRs), including the 
Cybersecurity Framework and Privacy Framework.20 Appendix 
II to A-130 addresses an agency’s Responsibility for Managing 
Personally Identifiable Information.21 It states that while 
FIPPs are not OMB requirements, “they are principles that 
should be applied by each agency according to the agency’s 
particular mission and privacy program requirements.”22 OMB 
finds that “FIPPS retain a consistent set of core principles that 
are broadly relevant to agencies’ information management 
practices.”23 The FIPPs as applicable to federal agencies are 
Access and Amendment. Agencies should provide individuals with 
appropriate access to PII and appropriate opportunity to correct or 
amend PII.24 
Accountability. Agencies should be accountable for complying with 
these principles and applicable privacy requirements, and should 
appropriately monitor, audit, and document compliance. Agencies 
should also clearly define the roles and responsibilities with respect 
to PII for all employees and contractors, and should provide 
                                                            
 19. Id. at 16–17. 
 20. Id. at 18. 
 21. Id. at Appendix II-1. Personally identifiable information (PII) is 
defined as “information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s 
identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked 
or linkable to a specific individual” and is necessarily very broad. Id. Appendix 
II discusses that agencies have to be very careful in determining what 
information is PII and that in some cases, information that was not PII can 
become PII when combined with other information. An agency needs to 
evaluate the “sensitivity of each individual data element that is PII, as well as 
all of the data elements together” and consider that the “sensitivity level of the 
PII will depend on the context.” Id. at Appendix II-2. 
 22. Id. at Appendix II-2. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. While “access and amendment” often appears as part of “individual 
participation,” the OMB notes that it is including it as a stand-alone principle 
in A-130 “to emphasize the importance of allowing individuals to access and 
amend their information when appropriate.” Id. at Appendix II-2 n.116. 
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appropriate training to all employees and contractors who have 
access to PII.25 
Authority. Agencies should only create, collect, use, process, store, 
maintain, disseminate, or disclose PII if they have authority to do so, 
and should identify this authority in the appropriate notice.26 
Minimization. Agencies should only create, collect, use, process, store, 
maintain, disseminate, or disclose PII that is directly relevant and 
necessary to accomplish a legally authorized purpose, and should only 
maintain PII for as long as is necessary to accomplish the purpose.27 
Quality and Integrity. Agencies should create, collect, use, process, 
store, maintain, disseminate, or disclose PII with such accuracy, 
relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to 
ensure fairness to the individual.28 
Individual Participation. Agencies should involve the individual in 
the process of using PII and, to the extent practicable, seek individual 
consent for the creation, collection, use, processing, storage, 
maintenance, dissemination, or disclosure of PII. Agencies should 
also establish procedures to receive and address individuals’ privacy-
related complaints and inquiries.29 
Purpose Specification and Use Limitation. Agencies should provide 
notice of the specific purpose for which PII is collected and should 
only use, process, store, maintain, disseminate, or disclose PII for a 
purpose that is explained in the notice and is compatible with the 
purpose for which the PII was collected, or that is otherwise legally 
authorized.30 
Security. Agencies should establish administrative, technical, and 
physical safeguards to protect PII commensurate with the risk and 
magnitude of the harm that would result from its unauthorized 
access, use, modification, loss, destruction, dissemination, or 
disclosure.31 
Transparency. Agencies should be transparent about information 
policies and practices with respect to PII, and should provide clear 
                                                            
 25. Id. at Appendix II-3. 
 26. Id. at Appendix II-3. While “authority” often appears as part of 
“purpose specification,” the OMB notes that it is including it as a stand-alone 
principle in A-130 “to emphasize the importance of identifying a specific 
authority for creating, collecting, using, processing, storing, maintaining, 
disseminating, or disclosing PII.” Id. at Appendix II-2 n.117. 
 27. Id. at Appendix II-3. The OMB notes that “minimization” is referred 
to as “collection limitation” in some versions of the FIPPs, such as in the 
OECD Guidelines. Id. at Appendix II-3 n.118. 
 28. Id. at Appendix II-3. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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and accessible notice regarding creation, collection, use, processing, 
storage, maintenance, dissemination, and disclosure of PII.32 
As described in Part II, NIST relates the predictability 
objective to the OMB circular, and to the FIPPs of authority, 
accountability, use and purpose limitation, and transparency.33 
II. THE NIST FRAMEWORKS 
The Privacy Framework follows from a successful and 
earlier cybersecurity risk framework (the “Cybersecurity 
Framework”).34 The Cybersecurity Framework was required to 
be implemented by federal entities, but it was subsequently 
widely adopted by the private sector.35 Because the Privacy 
Framework evolved from the Cybersecurity Framework and is 
an integrative part, it is relevant to briefly discuss its history 
and parallel to the Privacy Framework. 
A. THE CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 
In 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 13636, 
“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”36 Among 
                                                            
 32. Id. at Appendix II-2-3. The OMB notes that “transparency” is referred 
to as “openness” in some versions of the FIPPs, such as in the OECD 
Guidelines. Id. at Appendix II-3 n.119. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE LAUNCHES COLLABORATIVE PRIVACY 
FRAMEWORK EFFORT (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nist.gov/news-
events/news/2018/09/department-commerce-launches-collaborative-privacy-
framework-effort (stating that the success of the Cybersecurity Framework 
has provided guidance in developing the Privacy Framework). See generally 
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FRAMEWORK 
FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 1 (2014), 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf (“In 
enacting this policy, the Executive Order calls for the development of a 
voluntary risk-based Cybersecurity Framework–a set of industry standards 
and best practices to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks.”) 
[hereinafter CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK]. 
 35. See Armand J. Zottola, NIST in the Private Sector, DIG. RIGHTS 
REVIEW (Venable LLP Wash. D.C.), March 22, 2017, at 1, available at 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2878150e-9c01-4c05-b6fd-
06dbac58b4f7 (describing how the reach and influence of the Cybersecurity 
Framework has extended to the private sector). 
 36. See Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11739, 11739–40 (Feb. 12, 2013) (identifying privacy and civil liberties 
protections as essential in Section 5, and specifically naming the Fair 
Information Practices Principles as a fundamental building block). 
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other action items, the executive order tasked NIST with 
creating a Cybersecurity Framework that 
 
[I]nclude[s] a set of standards, methodologies, procedures, and 
processes that align policy, business, and technological approaches to 
address cyber risks. The Cybersecurity Framework shall incorporate 
voluntary consensus standards and industry best practices to the 
fullest extent possible. The Cybersecurity Framework shall be 
consistent with voluntary international standards when such 
international standards will advance the objectives of this order, and 
shall meet the requirements of the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology Act . . . 37 
Furthermore, NIST was instructed to produce a framework 
that would “[p]rovide a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, 
performance-based, and cost-effective approach, including 
information security measures and controls, to help owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure identify, assess, and manage 
cyber risk.”38 The Executive Order set the approach for creating 
secure cyber systems by focusing on the creation of a common 
language, employing a risk management approach, and 
requiring engagement across sectors, including voices from 
public and private entities.39 Over the next year, NIST held 
public meetings and received comments from a wide variety of 
interest groups and stakeholders across multiple domains.40 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to review the 
Cybersecurity Framework in detail, it is important to 
understand how it addressed the issue of privacy, and 
furthermore, how the framework has been widely accepted by 
the private sector cybersecurity community.41 The 
Cybersecurity Framework set the stage for work in the privacy 
arena,42 and the wide acceptance of the cybersecurity approach 
                                                            
 37. Id. at 11741. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 1 (explaining how 
the Executive Order was implemented through the Cybersecurity 
Framework). 
 40. See Janine S. Hiller & Roberta S. Russell, Modalities for Cyber 
Security and Privacy Resilience: The NIST Approach, 2015 PROC. OF THE 
ISCRAM, May 24–27, at 2. 
 41. See Zottola, supra note 35, at 1 (explaining the adoption of the 
Cybersecurity Framework in the private sector). 
 42. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 34, ¶ 3 (“We’ve 
had great success with broad adoption of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, 
and we see this as providing complementary guidance for managing privacy 
risk.”) (quotation omitted). 
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may help analogize how the NIST Privacy Framework might be 
similarly adopted and implemented. 
The Cybersecurity Framework built a common terminology 
and described a process for identifying and protecting assets, 
detecting threats and vulnerabilities, responding to attacks, 
and recovering from breaches.43 It provided a methodology to 
create an institutional profile, against which industry 
benchmarking could be carried out to understand the relative 
position of an organization and its cyber security strengths and 
weaknesses.44 Throughout, the framework included specific 
actions and references to specific best practices, international 
norms, industry standards, and existing cyber security 
processes.45 The resulting Cybersecurity Framework 
implemented a risk management approach, intended to be 
flexible and adaptable to a wide variety of government and 
private sector critical infrastructures.46 It is important to note 
that in addition to the federal systems where the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework can be mandatory, a great number of 
private sector players have also voluntarily adopted the 
approach.47 While there were criticisms, the NIST 
                                                            
 43. See CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 1, 7 (explaining 
the basics of the framework as providing a common language, identifying and 
prioritizing risk and managing cybersecurity across an entire organization ) 
 44. See id. at 4–5 (“The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity 
activities, desired outcomes, and applicable references that are common across 
critical infrastructure sectors.” This Core is then used to create a “Framework 
Profile” which can be used to benchmark and guide decision making). 
 45. See id. at 1 (“The Framework provides organization and structure to 
today’s multiple approaches to cybersecurity by assembling standards, 
guidelines, and practices that are working effectively in industry today.”). 
 46. See id. (“The Framework enables organizations – regardless of size, 
degree of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity sophistication – to apply the 
principles and best practices of risk management to improving the security 
and resilience of critical infrastructure.”). 
 47. “A recent Gartner study reported that NIST’s Cybersecurity 
Framework is already used by 30% of U.S. organizations. This number is 
expected to rise to 50% by 2020. According to a March 2016 survey by 
Dimensional Research, 70% of these organizations adopted the framework to 
align themselves with cybersecurity best practices, 29% were required to do so 
by business partners, and 28% adopted the framework because of federal 
contract requirements.” Zottola, supra note 35, at 1. There are applications in 
health, see Lee Kim, Building Holistic, Robust Security with the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework, HIMMS BLOG (Apr. 18, 2017), 
http://www.himss.org/news/ building-holistic-robust-security-nist-
cybersecurity-framework (calling for the adoption of the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework by healthcare organizations), and critical infrastructure, see U.S. 
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Cybersecurity Framework addressed cybersecurity in a 
systematic way that promoted enterprise decision making to 
assess capabilities, strengthen cyber security, and reduce 
vulnerabilities.48 The NIST cybersecurity risk management 
framework has been a successful core document and has been 
used not only by public agencies but by private business as 
well.49 
Cybersecurity and privacy are clearly not identical 
concerns, but NIST recognized their complex relationship by 
stating that “[i]ntegrating privacy and cybersecurity can 
benefit organizations by increasing customer confidence, 
enabling more standardized sharing of information, and 
simplifying operations across legal regimes.”50 Privacy 
                                                            
DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, 
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK https://www.us-cert.gov/ccubedvp/cybersecurity-
framework (last visited Nov. 19, 2018) (explaining critical infrastructure the 
Cybersecurity Framework can be used to protect); 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, WHY YOU SHOULD ADOPT THE NIST 
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 1 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-
it-effectiveness/ publications/assets/adopt-the-nist.pdf (“Framework targets 
organizations that own or operate critical infrastructure.”), and there is a 
proposed bill built on the framework, see Press Release, Congressman Ralph 
Abraham, Abraham Introduces the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Bill 
(February 28, 2017), https://abraham.house.gov/media-center/press-
releases/abraham-introduces-nist-cybersecurity-framework-bill (“H.R. 1224 
takes steps to prompt federal agencies to follow National Institute for 
Standards and Technology’s (NIST) widely accepted cybersecurity protocols 
and technical standards.”). 
 48. See CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 13 (“An 
organization can use the Framework as a key part of its systematic process for 
identifying, assessing, and managing cybersecurity risk.”). 
 49. See Zottola, supra note 35, at 1 (“[I]ts influence and standards are 
widely seen in the private sector and in many private sector commercial 
agreements.”). 
 50. CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 3. NIST recently 
released a document combining, for the first time, controls for both security 
and privacy; see also NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY SPECIAL 
PUBLICATION 800-53, REVISION 5 (2017), 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-53/sp800-53r5-draft.pdf. It states 
that it “provides a catalog of security and privacy controls for federal 
information systems and organizations.” Id. at ii. “NIST continues to work 
with the privacy community to better integrate privacy and security controls, 
and is particularly interested in how best to achieve such integration in this 
publication.” Id. at vi. The “latest draft goes beyond both information security 
and the federal government to address ways all kinds of organizations can 
maintain security and privacy in their interconnected systems.” NAT’L INST. 
OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST CRAFTS NEXT-
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protection was embedded in the Cybersecurity Framework in 
the sense that privacy impacts were part of a “general set of 
considerations” within the cybersecurity audit, privacy legal 
compliance activities, and training.51 Privacy was more 
specifically addressed, in part, within a parallel document 
called the “Roadmap,” released at the same time as the 
Cybersecurity Framework and meant to be a practical 
implementation aid.52 The Roadmap to the Cybersecurity 
Framework criticized the widely recognized FIPPs as being 
inadequate from a systems and risk management viewpoint 
because they lacked common definitions for privacy and privacy 
harms, and contained no metrics for measuring success or 
determining best practices.53 The Cybersecurity Framework 
and Roadmap led NIST to work towards a parallel privacy 
systems and risk approach to tackle privacy concerns. 
B. THE PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 
NIST began its work on creating a privacy framework 
along the same lines as the Cybersecurity Framework by first 
bringing stakeholders together. The first workshop in April 
2014 produced a debate between privacy scholars and systems 
developers around creating a common terminology with which 
multiple sides could communicate: 
A key objective of the workshop was to explore the proposition that 
development of privacy framework components analogous to other 
engineering fields would enable the creation of reusable, standards-
based tools and practices for developers. These tools and practices 
would facilitate the design and maintenance of systems and 
technologies with strong privacy postures.54 
                                                            
GENERATION SAFEGUARDS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND THE INTERNET OF 
THINGS (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2017/08/nist-
crafts-next-generation-safeguards-information-systems-and-internet. 
 51. CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 13. 
 52. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST 
ROADMAP FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY, (Feb. 
12, 2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/roadmap-021214.pdf 
[hereinafter CYBERSECURITY ROADMAP]; see also CYBERSECURITY 
FRAMEWORK, supra note 34, at 11 (discussing the roadmap). 
 53. See CYBERSECURITY ROADMAP, supra note 52 at 8–9. 
 54. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
SUMMARY OF THE PRIVACY ENGINEERING WORKSHOP AT THE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (Apr. 10, 2014), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/privacy-
workshop-summary-052114.pdf. 
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A NIST goal was to “enable the creation of new systems 
that mitigate the risk of privacy harm and address privacy 
risks in a measurable way within an organization’s overall risk 
management process.”55 
In anticipation of the second workshop, in September 2014, 
NIST published a “NIST Privacy Engineering Objectives and 
Risk Model Discussion Draft (the “Discussion Draft”).56 The 
Discussion Draft noted that “[i]n the security field, risk 
management models, along with technical standards and best 
practices, are key components of improving security. Similarly, 
the safety risk management field also has well-developed 
models, technical standards and best practices. To date, the 
privacy field has lagged behind in the development of 
analogous components.”57 For the first time, in an attempt to 
close that gap, NIST proposed a set of privacy engineering 
objectives—predictability, manageability, and confidentiality.58 
The Discussion Draft compared these three privacy objectives 
to the three cybersecurity objectives of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information.59 Like the three 
cybersecurity objectives that would mitigate cyber 
vulnerabilities, the proposed privacy objectives were intended 
to allow systems operators to mitigate privacy harms.60 NIST 
stated that in developing the three privacy objectives, its staff 
was guided by its review of “long-standing theories on the 
concept of privacy such as controlling for surprises and 
avoiding the ‘creepy’ factor, self-determination and individuals’ 
interest in controlling their information and freedom from 
intrusion.”61 
After the second workshop, in May 2015, NIST produced 
the Draft “Privacy Risk Management for Federal Information 
Systems” (Draft) that combined the elements of privacy 
                                                            
 55. Id. 
 56. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST 
PRIVACY ENGINEERING OBJECTIVES AND RISK MODEL DISCUSSION DRAFT 
(Sept. 15, 2014), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/01/19/nist_privacy_eng
r_objectives_risk_model_discussion_draft.pdf [hereinafter Discussion Draft]. 
 57. Id. at 1. An output of the first workshop was the Discussion Draft. 
 58. See id. at 2–3. 
 59. See id. (comparing cybersecurity and privacy objectives). 
 60. See id. at 3–4. 
 61. Id. at 2 (citations omitted). 
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engineering and risk management.62 The Draft again 
emphasized that “[f]ederal agencies need methods that yield 
repeatable and measurable results if they are to be able to 
implement privacy protections in information systems in a 
consistent manner,” and noted that while “existing tools such 
as the FIPPs and privacy impact assessments (PIAs) provide a 
foundation for taking privacy into consideration, they have not 
yet provided a method for federal agencies to measure privacy 
impacts on a consistent and repeatable basis.”63 The Draft 
discussed that in other areas, such as cybersecurity, “risk 
management has played a key role in enabling agencies to 
achieve their mission goals while minimizing adverse 
outcomes.”64 
The Draft included three privacy engineering objectives – 
predictability, manageability, and disassociability—“for the 
purpose of facilitating the development and operation of 
privacy-preserving information systems.”65 The objectives were 
designed “to enable system designers and engineers to build 
information systems that implement an agency’s privacy goals 
and support the management of privacy risk.”66 Like the three 
cybersecurity objectives, these three objectives “provide[d] a 
degree of precision and measurability, so that system designers 
and engineers, working with policy teams, can use them to 
bridge the gap between high-level principles and 
implementation.”67 The Draft noted that federal “agencies have 
been reliant on principles like the FIPPs that have provided a 
combination of values, governance principles, and 
requirements, but lack the concrete conceptualizations”68 that 
the three cybersecurity objectives provide. The FIPPS “do not 
yield an approach for consistent communication of outcome-
based aspects of a system that would enable engineers to 
                                                            
 62. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST 
INTERNAL REPORT 8062, DRAFT PRIVACY RISK MANAGEMENT FOR FEDERAL 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2015), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/nistir-
8062/nistir_8062_draft.pdf. 
 63. Id. at 1. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 21. 
 68. Id. at 17. 
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assess their systems for appropriate capabilities and system 
design options.”69 
The Draft emphasized that protecting privacy included not 
only preventing harms to privacy from unauthorized access, 
but also the “problematic data actions” that occurred during 
normal system behavior.70 It included an Appendix that listed 
and defined problematic data actions such as appropriation, 
distortion, induced disclosure, insecurity, surveillance, 
unanticipated revelation, and unwarranted restriction.71 
In January 2017, NIST published a revised version of the 
risk management approach (Privacy Framework).72 The 
Privacy Framework reiterates the vitality of a privacy 
engineering and risk management approach, and discusses the 
additional importance of managing privacy risk as required by 
the Office of Management and Budget’s updated Circular A-
130.73 Under A-130, there is “a new emphasis on managing 
privacy risk beyond solely compliance with privacy laws, 
regulations and policies.”74 
The revised draft describes the Privacy Framework and 
privacy protection as a multidisciplinary task that is constantly 
pushed by technology, stating that “Technological 
improvements can provide tremendous individual and societal 
benefits, but they also can have adverse effects on privacy at 
both the individual and societal levels. The ideal system would 
optimize benefits to the individual and society while 
minimizing the adverse effects.”75 Furthermore, “systems 
engineering and risk management processes could be used to 
integrate multidisciplinary approaches that can be 
incorporated into effective privacy solutions.”76 
                                                            
 69. Id. at 18. 
 70. Id. at 22. 
 71. See id. at 54 (Appendix E). 
 72. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO PRIVACY ENGINEERING AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN FEDERAL 
SYSTEMS (2017), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2017/NIST.IR.8062.pdf 
[hereinafter PRIVACY FRAMEWORK]. 
 73. See id. at 3. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 6. 
 76. Id. 
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Fundamentally, the Privacy Framework begins from the 
premise that security and privacy are often intertwined.77 It 
discusses how beneficial uses of new technology can 
inadvertently produce “an unintended consequence or 
byproduct of the system,”78 and that while many privacy 
problems79 arise from the unauthorized use of a system, other 
problems can arise from the authorized processing of 
information. Examples of problems from unauthorized access to 
PII are fairly well-known. They include “embarrassment or 
other emotional distress” from the disclosure of information, 
“economic loss from identity theft, or physical or psychological 
harm from ‘stalking.’”80 Examples of “[p]roblems from 
authorized processing may be less visible” or understood.81 
These include a discriminatory or stigmatizing effect on those 
receiving public benefits just from the collection information, 
frustration from knowledge of inaccurate information or the 
inability to correct it, and the loss of trust in a system that 
results in one’s avoidance of a product or service that might 
otherwise be beneficial.82 Such concerns about privacy and loss 
of trust in systems “could even contribute to systemic failures 
in our democratic institutions, such as voting.”83 For these 
reasons, it is “vital that engineers understand the issue and 
have the conceptual tools to build systems that minimize 
problems for individuals when processing their information.”84 
While acknowledging that there is no widely accepted 
definition of “privacy engineering,” the framework adopts a 
definition as “a specialty discipline of systems engineering 
                                                            
 77. See id. at 7–9. 
 78. Id. at 8. 
 79. The Privacy Framework adopts the term “privacy problem” to 
encompass what may otherwise be called privacy harm, privacy violation, 
privacy intrusion, or privacy invasion. See id. at 9–10. “This report uses 
‘privacy problems’ with the goal of enabling system engineers and privacy 
specialists to more dispassionately discuss the potential adverse consequences 
arising from the manner in which the system is processing PII.” Id. at 9. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. See id. (detailing the discrimination, frustration, and loss of trust that 
can result from authorized processing) 
 83. Id. at 9–10 (citing Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter Privacy in the Age of Big 
Data, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 861, 905–06 (2014) which discusses how large-scale 
data analytics can create privacy concerns in the electoral process outside of 
the ballot box). 
 84. Id. at 10. 
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focused on achieving freedom from conditions that can create 
problems for individuals with unacceptable consequences that 
arise from the system as it processes PII.”85 The framework 
discusses that while the FIPPs may have longstanding 
foundational meaning to those familiar with privacy principles, 
they provide little guidance for systems designers and 
implementers because they “contribute little to the 
development of a repeatable and measurable process that can 
be understood and communicated inside and outside the 
organization.”86 The FIPPs “are value statements rather than 
recipes,”87 while in contrast a privacy engineering process is an 
“outcome-based focus provid[ing] the frame of reference that 
can facilitate translation of privacy principles into system 
privacy requirements.”88 While privacy officers still need to 
provide expertise in identifying problems, “system engineers, 
by gaining an understanding of a clear privacy outcome, would 
be better positioned to become collaborative partners in the 
process of building more trustworthy systems.”89 The 
framework concludes this section of the report by warning that, 
like any system that contains an element of risk, there should 
be “no expectation that all privacy risk can be eliminated from 
a system when it is processing PII.”90 
The report discusses one of the challenges that it had at 
the very first workshop—”the communications gap between 
policy and legal teams and the engineering and information 
technology (IT) teams . . . .”91 Privacy engineering can help 
provide an outcome-oriented approach to translating privacy 
principles to privacy requirements.92 The framework asserts 
that these objectives “are not intended to be new statements of 
policy,” but rather, like the Cybersecurity Framework 
objectives, part of the “core characteristics of the systems.”93 
The privacy engineering objectives—predictability, 
                                                            
 85. Id. at 10–11. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (quoting JULIE MCEWEN ET AL., MITRE CORP., MITRE RESPONSE 
TO OSTP/NITRD ‘NATIONAL PRIVACY RESEARCH STRATEGY’ RFI 8 (2014)) 
 88. Id. at 12. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 16. 
 92. See Id. 
 93. Id. 
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manageability and disassociability—”are intended . . . to 
encourage the implementation of measurable controls for 
managing privacy risk” and “to help bridge the gap between 
high-level privacy principles and their implementation within 
systems.”94 
As early as the 2015 Draft, NIST stated that “[p]rivacy 
engineering objectives can play an important role in bridging 
the gap between an agency’s goals for privacy and their 
manifestation in information systems.”95 The 2017 Privacy 
Framework echoed this sentiment, and stated that the 
objectives would “provide a degree of precision” leading to 
“measurable goals for managing privacy risk.”96 By focusing on 
outcomes, privacy principles can then be translated “into 
system privacy requirements.”97 The vision is that by 
understanding the necessary privacy system outcomes, system 
engineers can be “collaborative partners”98 with privacy 
officers. 
III. PRIVACY ENGINEERING OBJECTIVES 
Three goals for standard setting seems to be de rigueur; 
the three cybersecurity objectives—confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability—are widely known information systems goals, 
and NIST proposes three privacy goals as well.99 Identification 
of privacy goals, as described in Part II, was not clear cut, and 
drafters were not convinced that the comparable, widely known 
FIPPs could suffice as core objectives or be understood as goals 
by a privacy engineer.100 The communication gap that NIST 
described as a challenge continues, as the three privacy 
objectives of predictability, manageability, and disassociability, 
are not generally well known. Part III discusses what these 
terms mean and how they relate to the FIPPS; Part IV then 
delves more deeply into the very important meaning of 
predictability. 
                                                            
 94. Id. 
 95. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 62, at 1. 
 96. PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 72, at 16. 
 97. Id. at 12. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See supra Part II. 
 100. See supra Part II. 
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A. PREDICTABILITY 
The first privacy engineering objective in the Privacy 
Framework—and the focus of Part IV—is predictability. It is 
defined as the “enabling of reliable assumptions by individuals, 
owners, and operators about PII and its processing by an 
information system.”101 According to the framework, a “reliable 
sense of what is occurring with PII in a system is core to 
building trust and accountability, and is a primary part of the 
underlying rationale for the transparency and accountability 
FIPPs.”102 It is important because “[b]y framing predictability 
in terms of reliable assumptions, agencies can begin to measure 
more concretely the capabilities in a system that supports these 
principles.”103 The framework provides an example of how what 
has generally been regarded as a privacy principle can become 
a measurable event.104 In most circumstances, if notice is 
provided to a user, the only event observed or recorded is 
whether the user was provided with notice.105 In contrast, it is 
suggested that an assessment could be made as to whether the 
user “read and understood the notice, or even whether they 
responded as anticipated.”106 
                                                            
 101. PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 72, at 17. 
 102. Id. at 18. Professors Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog argue that 
trust is an “essential ingredient for our digital lives.” Neil Richards & 
Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 431, 433 (2016). “Without trust, people share less information, bad 
information, or no information at all. They become anxious, bewildered, and 
suspicious . . . . If people don’t trust a company, they are more likely to switch 
to a competitor or resist or fail to become fully invested in the commercial 
relationship.” Id. at 435. They argue that “modern privacy law is incomplete 
because from its inception it has failed to account for the importance of trust.” 
Id. “One of the bedrock notions of privacy law is that companies should be 
transparent about their data collection, use, and disclosure practices so that 
individuals will be on notice of any potentially worrisome practices and can 
tailor their disclosures accordingly.” Id. at 462. “Trust need not be exclusively 
a matter of government policy. Companies can also voluntarily adopt trust-
enhancing internal policies, safeguards, and organizational schemes . . . . 
Companies can delete data when it is no longer needed and collect no more 
information than is necessary for the information relationship.” Id. at 465. 
These views are obviously quite consistent with the NIST objective of 
predictability. 
 103. PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 72, at 18 (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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Predictability is also “about designing systems so that 
stakeholders are not surprised by the handling of PII.”107 In this 
regard, predictability “can support a range of organizational 
interpretations of transparency—from a value statement about 
the importance of open processes to a requirements-based 
program that provides for the publication of how PII is 
managed.”108 Basic assessment tools, like user surveys, can be 
used to evaluate whether expectations are consistent with 
actual practice. Such surveys can also be used to assess 
whether a system’s actual disclosure of information, for 
example, is in line with assumptions that users have regarding 
what information about them will be disclosed. 
Predictability also supports purpose specification and use 
limitation.109 If there is a focus on “maintaining reliable 
assumptions about processing of PII, predictability could 
encourage system operators to assess and address the impact of 
any changes in that processing.”110 If operators are diligent in 
keeping the users interested and involved in the discussion of 
their expectations, predictability can facilitate the 
“maintenance of stable, trusted relationships between systems 
and individuals . . . .”111 
B. MANAGEABILITY 
The second privacy engineering objective in the Privacy 
Framework is manageability, which is defined as “providing 
the capability for granular administration of personal 
information including alteration, deletion, and selective 
disclosure.”112 “Manageability is an important system property 
enabling several of the FIPPs: access and amendment; 
accountability; minimization; quality and integrity; and 
individual participation.”113 Systems must be able to 
administer information at a sufficiently granular level to be 
able to identify and correct inaccurate information, to dispose 
of obsolete information, to collect or disclose only necessary 
                                                            
 107. Id. (emphasis added). 
 108. Id. at 18–19. 
 109. Id. at 19. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 17. 
 113. Id. at 19. 
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information, and to assure that user’s privacy preferences are 
accurately implemented and maintained.114 
The framework emphasizes that manageability is not a 
policy statement about whether users should have the right to 
control their information, but rather a systems requirement 
that information can be controlled at a level sufficient to 
perform a variety of required operations on the data. Authority 
to make those changes is a separate issue.115 
C. DISASSOCIABILITY 
The third privacy engineering objective introduced in the 
Privacy Framework is disassociability, defined as “enabling the 
processing of PII or events without association to individuals or 
devices beyond the operational requirements of the system.”116 
This objective maps primarily across the FIPPs objective of 
minimization, but also of authority.117 Disassociability is 
directed at making sure a system “actively protects or ‘blinds’ 
an individual’s identity or associated activities from 
exposure.”118 It “advances the capabilities of a privacy-
preserving system by engaging system designers and engineers 
in a deliberate consideration of points of exposure that are not 
essential for the operation of the system.”119 
“[A]chieving this objective should reflect the ability of the 
system to complete [a] transaction without associating 
information with individuals.”120 For example, while the 
completion of a health care-related transaction may require 
associating information with an individual, the association of 
that information “should not be deemed an operational 
requirement just because it would be difficult to disassociate 
the information” from that individual.121 Agencies must assess 
the risk involved with associating information with an 
individual and understand that the recognition of such risk is a 
separate issue than being able to make that association as an 
                                                            
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 17. 
 117. See id. at 20. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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operational requirement.122 In other words, the agency may 
choose to accept the risk because it is too difficult or costly to 
implement stronger, more privacy-preserving controls.123 It is 
in this arena that technological advances in cryptography, 
anonymity, de-identification and others may prove to be 
extremely useful in mitigating privacy risks.124 
In summary, the Privacy Framework maps the FIPPs 
principles of accountability, authority, purpose specification 
and use limitation, and transparency across the predictability 
objective; access and amendment, accountability, minimization, 
quality and integrity, and individual participation across the 
manageability objective; and accountability and minimization 
across the disassociability objective. Manageability and 
disassociability can be accomplished by different technical 
means by system operators, and stakeholders can debate 
whether the means are strong or effective enough. These 
aspects are largely measurable. However, the predictability 
objective, with its decisions pertaining to data purpose and 
broader use, is arguably the most important of these 
interrelated privacy objectives. The definition of predictability 
is less clear and less satisfying.125 The definition of 
predictability presumes that processing of data will evolve and 
change, that system operators can identify what assumptions 
stakeholders make about how the data will be used in the 
future, and can determine and avoid surprising citizens. 
Maintaining trust is much about preserving predictability,126 
and thus it is essential to analyze this cog that holds the 
privacy framework together. 
IV. THE MEANING AND APPLICATION OF 
PREDICTABILITY 
Predictability is a cornerstone of any rule of law,127 but 
particularly in a common law system. The common law is 
effective when it provides predictability. Individuals and 
                                                            
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 17. 
 126. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 127. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (“[U]ncertainty has been regarded as 
incompatible with the Rule of Law.”). 
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business can make plans because they have confidence in the 
predictability of legal outcomes. Much of the rationale for the 
doctrine of stare decisis is related to the importance of the 
stability and predictability of the law.128 In that regard, it is 
certainly no surprise that one of NIST’s privacy engineering 
objectives is predictability. In order for there to be confidence in 
a system, its users and those whom it affects should be able to 
build expectations upon predictability. 
NIST is not a policy-setting agency; one of its goals is to 
promote standardization in technical systems.129 Because 
privacy is not a technical system however, any technical 
standard will necessarily have legal and social implications. 
The Privacy Framework system goal of predictability needs to 
be considered from these viewpoints, to analyze whether it is 
the appropriate systems goal for protecting privacy. The NIST 
framework does not develop the definition of predictability, yet 
it is identified as one of the “north stars” for systems design 
and maintenance to protect privacy. There are no third-party 
standards for predictability for reference. Ultimately what this 
section grapples with is: “What does it mean for a system to be 
predictable so that privacy is protected?” 
The following sections analyze the meaning of 
predictability by using comparisons from the law that are most 
connected to the concept of predictability as conceived by NIST: 
(1) preventing surprise; and (2) avoiding creepiness.130 The 
analogies we believe are closest to these concepts are patent 
law’s nonobviousness requirement and the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonable expectation of privacy. To be clear, we 
are not arguing that there is a direct relationship between 
these legal concepts and the application of the Privacy 
Framework to agencies’ data actions, but that the comparisons 
are fruitful and can suggest actions for applying the objective 
in order to most effectively protect privacy in federal 
information systems. 
                                                            
 128. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A 
Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2012) (“Everyone thinks that 
considerations of [predictability] are of great importance in justifying stare 
decisis.”). 
 129. About NIST, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., 
https://www.nist.gov/about-nist (last updated June 14, 2017). 
 130. See Discussion Draft, supra note 56, at 2. 
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A. PATENT LAW AND NONOBVIOUSNESS 
The term “predictability” is found fairly prominently in the 
legal literature as it applies to determining patent obviousness. 
There may initially seem to be little relevance between patent 
law and defining privacy goals for data systems, but 
interestingly there is a useful parallel, a construct that may 
help analyze the protection of privacy in a world of swiftly 
evolving technology. 
Patent law requires inventions to be non-obvious in order 
to obtain intellectual property protection.131 The same 
requirement applies to improvements; when an inventor 
improves upon an existing, patent-protected technology or 
product, the improvement itself must be non-obvious in order 
to obtain a patent.132 The legal determination of whether the 
improvement is obvious, and therefore not patentable, invokes 
the question of whether the improvement upon, or a different 
use of, an existing invention is predictable.133 Obviousness is a 
legal question, but it is based on a factual determination.134 
The 1966 Supreme Court decision in Graham v. John Deere135 
adopted three factual questions relevant to determining 
                                                            
 131. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) provides that: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that 
the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if 
the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that 
the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by 
the manner in which the invention was made. 
We do not extend the analogy too far between patent obviousness and privacy 
engineering because of differing policies underlying the analysis. In patent 
law predictability is to be avoided because “[g]ranting patent protection to 
advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation 
retards progress and may, in the case of patents combining previously known 
elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.” KSR International 
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). In privacy engineering, 
predictability is desired in order to support the reliable assumptions, or 
reasonable expectations, of privacy. General analogy can be helpful to examine 
the meaning of predictability, but at a more fine-grained level the analogy 
breaks down due to opposite policy preferences for or against predictability. 
 132. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2141 (9th ed., Jan. 2018) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 
417) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
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obviousness for an improvement: (1) the state of the prior art; 
(2) the difference between the prior art and the invention; and 
(3) the ordinary skill of a practitioner in the relevant field.136 
The USPTO explains; 
In short, the focus when making a determination of obviousness 
should be on what a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art 
would have known at the time of the invention, and on what such a 
person would have reasonably expected to have been able to do in 
view of that knowledge. This is so regardless of whether the source of 
that knowledge and ability was documentary prior art, general 
knowledge in the art, or common sense.137 
Analogizing patent nonobviousness and predictability 
inquiries to privacy and predictability for systems engineering, 
the patent applicant wants the gap to be large and 
unpredictable so that they may obtain a patent, whereas the 
systems engineer does not want the gap to surprise 
stakeholders. Stated another way, predictability is bad for the 
patent applicant but good for the privacy engineer. The 
conditions for and analysis of what makes a patent 
improvement obvious or an information system data processing 
surprising, are mutually informative, as the information 
system being assessed is analogous to the improvement upon 
the existing patent. Applying the Graham gap test to the 
predictability of systems, an engineer first needs to understand 
the prior art of privacy. 
1. Prior Art and Privacy 
The state of the art of privacy is analogous to the prior art 
related to existing patents and common knowledge in the field. 
As data collection and processing increases, from digital 
footprints,138 to increasing sensorization of the environment,139 
                                                            
 136. MPEP supra note 132. The USPTO examiner will evaluate the gap 
based on these facts and will consider additional factors such as “commercial 
success, long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, and unexpected 
results,” to make a determination. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Mary Madden et al., Digital Footprints, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 16, 
2007), http://www.pewinternet.org/2007/12/16/digital-footprints/. 
 139. See Peter Clarke, Yole Predicts the ‘Sensorization’ of Modern Life, EE 
TIMES (June 12, 2015), 
https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1326858. 
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to systems of data systems, and predictive analytic systems,140 
this first step makes it essential to have a longitudinal 
understanding of the privacy environment and how the system 
processes information in variance from current law and norms. 
This will be a difficult task, as there is no database similar to 
the USPTO database that can be searched to determine if there 
is a history of any similar collection or use of the information in 
a system, although the USPTO search for prior art is broader 
than such a theoretical database. The first step would be, 
however, to interrogate past agency or entity processing of data 
in a similar manner to begin to understand the prior art, and 
the stakeholders’ reliable assumptions. The discrepancy, 
however, is that unlike the grant of a patent, past system 
practices have not been vetted, and the internal investigation 
of prior systems and their effect will not include external 
systems that would affect a stakeholder’s reliable assumption 
of how the data will be processed more generally. 
Patent examiners are instructed to consider the prior art 
in both the field in which the invention is situated and the 
“prior art that is in a field of endeavor other than that of the 
[patent] applicant . . . or solves a problem which is different 
from that which the applicant was trying to solve.”141 As 
difficult as a patent examination is to execute, the privacy 
engineer’s job will be much more complex and difficult. An 
additional part of the analogy is that just as the patent 
examination must consider different fields of practice, the 
privacy engineer should consider different contexts when 
viewing the prior art. This is the stage at which NIST’s 
reference to the necessity of interactions between the privacy 
engineer and the privacy officer, and inclusion of laws, 
regulations, and norms, is essential to establish privacy prior 
art. 
2. Ordinary Skill and Stakeholders 
Whether an invention is obvious—or predictable—is 
measured through the eyes of one who has ordinary skill in the 
                                                            
 140. See Dennis Hirsh, Introduction to Predictive Analytics Law and 
Policy: A New Filed Emerges, 14 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO SOC’Y 1, 1–3 
(2017). 
 141. MPEP, supra note 132. 
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area.142 In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (“KSR”),143 the 
Supreme Court stated that: 
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives 
and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the 
same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can 
implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. 
For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one 
device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that 
it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the 
technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her 
skill.144 
In this context, the definition of who has ordinary skill in 
assumptions about processing of PII matters greatly, as this 
defines the eyes through which privacy implications of the 
system will be viewed; the stakeholder is analogous to the 
person of ordinary skill in patent law. The USPTO 
Examination Guidelines explain that, 
The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is 
presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. 
Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary 
skill in the art may include: (1) “type of problems encountered in the 
art;” (2) “prior art solutions to those problems;” (3) “rapidity with 
which innovations are made;” (4) “sophistication of the technology; 
and” (5) “educational level of active workers in the field.”145 
The factors relevant to ordinary skill in patent law may 
also be helpful for analyzing the nature of a reliable 
assumption; the hypothetical person should understand: the 
sophistication of the individuals whose PII is being used can 
change the assumptions of what a system will do, rapidly 
changing use of PII may make it difficult to make accurate 
assumptions, and unusual uses of PII or quickly changing uses 
of PII due to technical advances. Again, the privacy officer 
could be the best situated to reflect upon both sides of the 
equation. 
3. The Gap Between Old and New 
In sum, the patent applicant must show that “the 
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art 
elements according to their established functions.”146 Assessing 
                                                            
 142. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 143. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 144. Id. at 417 (emphasis added). 
 145. MPEP supra note 132. 
 146. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. 
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the gap between the prior art and the invention through the 
view of the skilled person in the area is the final step to 
determine predictability and nonobviousness. A gap analysis 
was firmly established as precedent, the core component to 
decide whether an invention was predictable. In 2007, the 
Supreme Court in KSR added nuance to the determination by 
rejecting a formulistic approach to determining obviousness.147 
The Court held that in addition to considering the gap between 
the inventions and the state of prior art, that “[t]he 
combination of familiar elements according to known methods 
is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield 
predictable results.”148 In cases of inventions that combine the 
functions of two previously known technologies to create a 
third, “it can be important to identify a reason that would have 
prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to 
combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention 
does.”149 In other words, “a court must ask whether the 
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art 
elements according to their established functions.”150 In 
addition, secondary considerations should be included in the 
analysis and subsequent guidance from the USPTO lists these 
factors: 
(A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to 
yield predictable results; 
(B) Simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain 
predictable results; 
(C) Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or 
products) in the same way; 
(D) Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or 
product) ready for improvement to yield predictable results; 
(E) “Obvious to try” – choosing from a finite number of identified, 
predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success.151 
                                                            
 147. It is beyond the scope of this article, but the KSR decision has been 
subject to criticism and the claim that it moves the test for obviousness on a 
scale previously tending towards objectivity instead towards subjectivity. See 
Gene Quinn, KSR the 5th Anniversary: One Supremely Obvious Mess, IP 
WATCHDOG (Apr. 29, 2012), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/04/29/ksr-the-
5th-anniversary-one-supremely-obvious-mess/id=24456/. 
 148. KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. 
 149. Id. at 418. 
 150. Id. at 417. 
 151. MPEP, supra note 132. F and G are not included in the list as they are 
incorporated into the general analysis discussed above. “(F) Known work in 
one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it for use in either the same 
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These elements might be mapped to the flexible uses of PII 
in information systems and predictability as described by the 
NIST goal. The question becomes whether the use of PII in a 
secondary way could arguably be analyzed with regard to a 
predictable outcome similar to the guidelines for patent 
predictability. Such mapping could produce the following 
allowable actions: 
(A) PII that has been used predictably in two different 
ways can be combined if there are predictable results; 
(B) Simple substitution of one use for PII for another use 
for PII to obtain predictable results; 
(C) Use of PII in a known way is predictable if used in 
another system (methods, or products) in the same way; 
(D) Applying a known technique to a known device 
(method, or product) ready for improvement to yield predictable 
results; 
(E) If it is “Obvious to combine” PII – choosing from a finite 
number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable 
expectation of success. 
Professor Christopher Cotropia points out two variations in 
the predictability analysis within KSR’s definition152 and 
names these Type I and Type II predictability. Type I 
predictability is the analysis established before KSR, focusing 
on the gap between an existing patented technology and the 
improvement on that technology being reviewed for 
nonobviousness and patentability.153 Cotropia summarizes 
Type 1 predictability analysis as “whether bridging this gap 
would have been obvious to one skilled in the art or not.”154 
Type II predictability, on the other hand, does not focus on the 
difference between the inventions but rather focuses on the 
“predictability as to results,”155 which seems to closely map to 
                                                            
field or a different one based on design incentives or other market forces if the 
variations are predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art; (G) Some 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would have led one of 
ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference or to combine prior art 
reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention.” Id. 
 152. See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, Predictability and 
Nonobviousness in Patent Law After KSR, 20 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 391 (2014). 
 153. Id. at 397. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 405. 
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the NIST goal for privacy engineering. Cotropia criticizes Type 
II predictability because of its “inability to provide insight to 
the size of the gap.”156 In sum, Type I predictability asks 
whether the invention’s creation was predictable, whereas Type 
II asks whether the “invention produces predictable results.”157 
This is a significant difference, as it “shifts the substantive 
questions . . . [to focus on] the invention and how it 
operates.”158 
There is a striking comparison between the patent analysis 
of predictability and the use of PII in information systems 
under FIPPs and the NIST concept of predictability. Similar to 
Type I analysis, FIPPs data use requirements revolve around a 
determination of whether the data are being used for purposes 
that are the same as disclosed, agreed upon, and purposed for; 
a small or nonexistent gap would result in predictability.159 The 
use of the patent examination framework of considering prior 
art and the ordinarily skilled person could be helpful in this 
analysis. The NIST approach, however, arguably uses a Type II 
form of predictability that focuses on the resulting functions of 
the system and whether the use of PII results in surprise.160 
A fundamental criticism of Type II predictability is that it 
results in hindsight bias, or what is commonly known as 
“Monday Morning Quarterbacking.”161 People tend to analyze 
past events differently once they know the results. It is much 
easier to believe an “event is more predictable after it becomes 
known than it was before it became known”162 The result is 
that “because the perspective of the skilled artisan is changed 
from being prospective to being retrospective,” this “increases 
the likelihood of errors”163 in determining predictability. In a 
particularly relevant comment for privacy, Cotropia describes 
the impact as the “risks of journeying down a development path 
                                                            
 156. Id. at 407. 
 157. Id. at 412. 
 158. Id. at 424. 
 159. See supra Part I.A. 
 160. See supra Part II. 
 161. See, e.g., Therese A. Louie, Mahesh N. Rajan & Robert E. Sibley, 
Tackling the Monday Morning Quarterbacking: Applications of Hindsight Bias 
in Decision-Making Settings, 25 SOC. COGNITION 32 (2007) 
 162. Neal J. Roese & Kathleen D. Vohs, Hindsight Bias, 7 PERSP. ON 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 411, 411 (2012). 
 163. Cotropia, supra note 152, at 424. 
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that an ordinary skilled artisan would not have taken.”164 The 
NIST approach to privacy engineering risks the same hindsight 
bias by using a Type II predictability analysis that looks back 
at the way that the system supports reliable assumptions about 
how PII will be used in that same system. Without at least 
including a joint Type I analysis that looks at the gap between 
different uses of the information (prior art) under the standard 
of the ordinarily skilled artisan, the flexibility that NIST 
incorporates in its vision may be a self-fulfilling and hollow 
exercise. 
Furthermore, the standard of the ordinarily skilled artisan 
is deeply connected with the legally prominent concept of the 
reasonable person, based on the on the benchmark of the 
ordinarily prudent person. Privacy rights under the Fourth 
Amendment have for a long time been viewed through the lens 
of reasonable expectations, which also incorporates this 
approach.165 The next section explores these concepts as related 
to predictability and what it means to have reasonable 
assumptions about the use of data in an information system. 
B. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AND PREDICTABILITY 
The NIST privacy objectives are applied to data that are in 
an agency’s system of records. They are not meant to be applied 
to decide whether an agency can collect that data without a 
warrant and whether the data collection might violate the 
Fourth Amendment.166 It should be noted that to that extent, 
the concept of reasonable expectations, which is part of any 
discussion about the meaning of privacy in the Fourth 
Amendment context, is not applicable. But, the definition of 
predictability, using the term reliable assumptions, is 
perilously similar to the reasonable expectation term of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. As the previous discussion of 
patent nonobviousness and predictability revealed, reasonable 
                                                            
 164. Id. 
 165. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 166. See Harold Laidlaw, Shouting Down the Well: Human Observation As 
a Necessary Condition of Privacy Breach, and Why Warrants Should Attach to 
Data Access, Not Data Gathering, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 323, 353 (2015) 
(“The administrative information exception is intended to be uncontroversial. 
Essentially it serves the interest of avoiding formalistic restrictions on the 
access of data that may be passively gathered but which has historically been 
considered categorically available to state actors.”). 
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expectations are part of the analysis. For this comparative 
reason, the next section discusses the history of reasonable 
expectations, and its challenges for relevance in an era of 
technological change. How to reliably predict potentially 
changing assumptions is where the comparison to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy can be instructive. “[T]he 
reasonable person’s task in the law . . . is the sound resolution 
of whatever rational conflict the law may throw at him.”167 This 
also serves the purpose of keeping the determination as a 
question of fact, rather than a question of law.168 “[T]he 
generalisations made in the name of the reasonable person are 
not legal generalisations. They do not enter the law. They are 
used by the law to avoid the need for a legal generalisation to 
be made.”169 This becomes relevant to the notion of 
predictability as an objective concept that is quantifiable and 
factual. 
1. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Ever since its creation more than fifty years ago in Katz v. 
United States,170 the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test 
has served as the barometer for privacy protection under the 
Fourth Amendment. However, due in large part to evolving 
surveillance techniques and ubiquitous digital collection of 
information, this standard may fail. As Professor Daniel Solove 
stated, “the reasonable expectation of privacy test cannot be 
resuscitated . . . [and it] is not merely in need of repair—it is 
doomed.”171 The question is whether the notion of predictability 
suffers from the same inherent weaknesses, or whether lessons 
from reasonable expectation jurisprudence can provide a map 
for avoiding the pitfalls. 
In Katz v. United States, in order to collect evidence about 
illegal gambling, the FBI surreptitiously recorded a telephone 
conversation by attaching a tape recorder on the outside and 
                                                            
 167. John Gardner, The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person, 131 L.Q. 
REV. 563, 565 (2015). 
 168. See id. at 569 (clarifying that the reasonable person standard is often 
explained as “a question of fact, not a question of law”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 171. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 
1511, 1521 (2010). 
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top of two public telephone booths.172 The defendant made the 
call from inside one of the two booths after walking in and 
closing the door behind him.173 The Supreme Court held that 
this was an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment 
because the FBI had violated Katz’ privacy.174 The legacy of the 
Katz case came not from the majority opinion, but rather from 
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion,175 which was subsequently 
adopted by the majority of the Court a year later in Terry v. 
Ohio.176 The operative language from Harlan’s concurrence is: 
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions 
is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’ Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where 
he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he 
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no 
intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other 
hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being 
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances 
would be unreasonable.177 
It is regrettable that over the last fifty years so much 
emphasis has been placed on trying to make sense of the 
differences between the supposed two prongs of the Katz test, 
when, arguably, none was intended by the Court.178 In 2015, 
Professor Orin Kerr wrote Katz Has Only One Step: The 
                                                            
 172. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
 173. Id. at 352. 
 174. Id. at 353. 
 175. Id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 176. See 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 177. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 178. In two excellent companion articles, Peter Winn and Harvey 
Schneider discuss the history of the Katz case in great detail. Peter Winn, 
Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009); Harvey A. Schneider, Katz v. United States: The 
Untold Story, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 13 (2009). Schneider was the then 
twenty-nine-year-old lawyer who argued for Katz before the Supreme Court. 
Schneider described in detail how he argued to the Court that what he was 
proposing was an objective test – not a subjective one. He wrote: “We propose 
a test using a way that’s not too dissimilar from the tort ‘reasonable man’ 
test . . . we would ask that the test be applied as to whether or not a third 
person objectively looking at the entire scene could reasonably interpret, and 
could reasonably say, that the communicator intended his communication to 
be confidential.” Id. at 20. 
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Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations,179 arguing two 
significant points. First, the results of an empirical study based 
upon 540 cases that employed the Katz test showed that, in the 
vast majority of cases, courts applied only the objective test, 
and not the subjective test.180 
Secondly, Kerr makes a convincing argument that Harlan 
likely never intended that there be a separate, truly subjective 
inquiry, even though subsequent cases and articles have 
awkwardly attempted or pretended to do so ever since. Kerr 
focuses on Harlan’s statement that the test was “an 
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior 
decisions”181 and that Harlan “did not intend to create a new 
test from whole cloth.”182 In order to be consistent with 
Harlan’s assertion that he was not creating a new test, one can 
read the second sentence as referring to the then-existing line 
of cases involving a “voluntary exposure of protected spaces” 
and the third sentence as referring to the then-existing 
“protected-area cases.”183 This would explain why Harlan 
referred to this line of cases as “subjective” in nature, and 
would be consistent with his assertion that the “rule has 
emerged from prior decisions.”184 
Although it may not have been within the contemplation of 
the NIST drafters, to meet the predictability objective a system 
operator will necessarily need to choose how to assess 
individual assumptions about the use of information; this 
invokes a similar decision and struggle about whether to use a 
subjective or objective standard, or both. The determination 
will be affected, one way or another, by changes in technology 
and by an evolution in assumptions about how systems of data 
will be used and ultimately how they will impact personal life. 
Reliable assumptions will be difficult to assess because they 
can change with the times, circumstances, and social values, so 
                                                            
 179. Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective 
Expectations, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 113 (2015). 
 180. “The results of the study suggest that the subjective prong of Katz is 
irrelevant. A majority of cases applying Katz did not mention subjective 
expectations. Only 12 percent of Katz cases purported to apply the subjective 
test. Only 2 percent of Katz cases claimed to hinge their analysis on the 
subjective test.” Id. at 122. 
 181. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan concurring). 
 182. Kerr, supra note 179, at 124. 
 183. Kerr, supra note 179, at 126. 
 184. Id. 
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comparing them to the history and jurisprudence of the 
reasonable man standard seems a perfect analogy for the fast-
moving subject of data analytics. The analogy provides a 
warning, as Professor Daniel Solove states that, “the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a contentious 
jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency,”185 and that 
application of this approach to privacy has “failed to live up to 
aspirations.”186 In the years following Katz, the Supreme Court 
“adopted a conception of privacy that countless commentators 
have found to be overly narrow, incoherent, short-sighted, 
deleterious to liberty, and totally out of touch with society.”187 
“As Justice Scalia once stated, ‘In my view, the only thing the 
past three decades have established about the Katz test . . . is 
that, unsurprisingly, [reasonable expectations of privacy] bear 
an uncanny resemblance to those expectation of privacy that 
this Court considers reasonable.’”188 
A brief review of cases following Katz shows how the 
application of the reasonable expectation standard has 
significantly hampered the law pertaining to privacy 
protection. In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held 
that an individual does not have an expectation of privacy in 
financial records once he or she has shared them with a 
bank.189 In Smith v. Maryland, the Court similarly held that 
there was no expectation of privacy in the list of phone 
numbers one has dialed once that list has been shared with the 
phone company.190 This so-called “third party doctrine” has 
proven to be a major impediment in protecting informational 
privacy as it is rare that information today is not shared 
somehow or someway with someone.191 These and following 
decisions192 have been criticized as being ill-suited for today’s 
                                                            
 185. Solove, supra note 171, at 1511. 
 186. Id. at 1519. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1521 (quoting from Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, at 97 
(Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 189. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, at 442 (1976). 
 190. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). 
 191. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 
1151–52 (2002). 
 192. In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), the Supreme Court 
found a defendant to have no reasonable expectation of privacy in his fenced 
backyard from a private plane flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet because 
defendant’s “expectation that his yard was protected from such surveillance 
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data-driven world and as over-emphasizing the secrecy aspect 
of privacy: “Life in the modern Information Age often involves 
exchanging information with third parties, such as phone 
companies, Internet service providers, cable companies, 
merchants, and so on. Thus, clinging to the notion of privacy as 
total secrecy would mean the practical extinction of privacy in 
today’s world.”193 Solove asks: “Would the Supreme Court 
really hold that people lack an expectation of privacy in their 
medical information because they convey that information to 
their physicians? This result would strike many as absurd.”194 
It is fair to question whether the reasonable expectation 
standard has deviated too far from the reasonable person 
standard, becoming unrealistic and ineffective, by setting 
bright line distinctions such as the third party test.195 The 
reliable assumptions objective could avoid this problem by 
avoiding a rules oriented approach and remaining true to a 
standard, such as the reasonable person standard, that 
considers the circumstances and context. 
                                                            
was unreasonable, because ‘[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace 
who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed.’” 
Id. 213–14. In California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), the Supreme 
Court held that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the garbage he left at his curb for pickup by the sanitation department. The 
Court stated that the warrantless search and seizure of the garbage would 
violate the Fourth Amendment only if the defendant “manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in [his] garbage that society accepts as objectively 
reasonable . . . [and] that an expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth 
Amendment protection . . . unless society is prepared to accept that 
expectation as objectively reasonable.” Id. 39–40. 
 193. See Solove, supra note 191, at 1152. In U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 
(2012), the Supreme Court decided that a 4-week attachment of a GPS device 
to the underbelly of a car violated the Fourth Amendment. Justice Sotomayor, 
in a concurring opinion, questioned whether the third-party doctrine is still 
appropriate: “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed 
to third parties. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). She stated that this 
“approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks.” Id. 
 194. Solove, supra note 171, at 1532. 
 195. The Supreme Court recently refused to extend the third party doctrine 
to the cell-site location information that is routinely generated and used by 
mobile telephones, in Carpenter v. U. S., 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). There were 
five separate opinions in the case with multiple criticisms of the Katz test and 
multiple calls for positive legislation regarding data privacy. See generally 
Jordan M. Blanke, Carpenter v. United States Begs for Action, 2018 U. ILL. L. 
REV. ONLINE 260. 
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In Florida v. Riley,196 the Supreme Court again foreclosed 
a variety of potential privacy arguments by making, in 
retrospect, a very broad holding. While it recognized that the 
defendant clearly had a subjective expectation of privacy in his 
backyard greenhouse, it held that there was no objective 
expectation of privacy.197 The plurality held that the defendant 
“could not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was 
protected from public or official observation”198 as long as the 
plane was flying in navigable airspace, as “[a]ny member of the 
public could legally have been flying over [his] property in a 
helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed 
[his] greenhouse.”199 Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring 
opinion that the defendant’s “expectation of privacy was 
unreasonable not because the airplane was operating where it 
had a ‘right to be,’ but because public air travel at 1,000 feet is 
a sufficiently routine part of modern life that it is unreasonable 
for persons on the ground to expect that their curtilage will not 
be observed from that altitude.”200 This is an extremely broad 
statement. The three-justice dissent criticized the plurality’s 
decision and Justice O’Connor’s observation because under that 
interpretation, one’s “expectation of privacy is defeated if a 
single member of the public could conceivably position herself 
to see into the area in question without doing anything 
illegal.”201 
Another line of Supreme Court cases that was decided 
solely on the basis of the objective standard of the Katz test, 
also resulted in diminishing expectations of privacy. In 
O’Connor v. Ortega,202 the Court addressed whether a public 
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk 
drawers and personal file cabinets in his office.203 The Court 
stated that the “operational realities of the workplace . . . may 
make some employees’ expectations of privacy unreasonable 
                                                            
 196. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 197. Id. at 450. The Greenwood and Riley holdings are also criticized by 
Solove as further examples of too narrowly interpreting privacy as secrecy. 
Solove, supra note 171 at 1520–21. 
 198. See Florida v. Riley, supra note 196, at 450. 
 199. Id. at 451. 
 200. Id. at 452, 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 201. Id. at 456, 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 202. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
 203. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 711–12 (1987). 
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when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law 
enforcement official.”204 The Court stated that the expectations 
of both public and private employees in “their offices, desks, 
and file cabinets . . . may be reduced by virtue of actual office 
practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.”205 This 
holding, along with those in similar cases, has pretty much 
solidified the objective societal value (applying the second 
prong of the Katz test) that there is virtually no expectation of 
privacy in the workplace. 
The reasonable expectation of privacy jurisprudence 
identifies several pitfalls that plague the application of an 
objective standard. Any agency or company that seeks to apply 
predictability under the Privacy Framework as a concrete 
objective can learn from and attempt to avoid these pitfalls. 
Although predictability is described as a measurable goal, the 
expectation of privacy cases teach that while applying an 
objective standard is not simple, efforts to draw strict 
boundaries can create illogical results. The first issue is that of 
the dynamic nature of systems change; both technology 
developments and the adaptation of assumptions are part of 
that environment. An analysis of how the application of a 
reasonable expectation standard was not able to keep up with 
the technology holds lessons for the application of reliable 
assumptions. 
2. Reliable Assumptions and Pitfalls 
NIST applies the objective of predictability, defined as 
reliable assumptions, to the context of all stakeholders: 
citizens, users, and system administrators alike.206 This 
discussion is limited to how the goal of predictability can be 
understood from the perspective of citizens’ reliable 
assumptions.207 In a prescient 2002 article, Shaun Spencer 
described the inevitable erosion inherent in the expectation-
                                                            
 204. Id. at 717. 
 205. Id.. at 717. See infra notes 177-184 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Discussion Draft, supra note 56, 18–19. The Draft does not clearly 
define a stakeholder. The text discusses agencies and system owners and 
operators, but the footnotes refer to studies of enabling consumer trust by 
protecting consumer privacy. We assume that consumers—citizens—are 
stakeholders, and that their reliable assumptions, and preventing surprise, 
are key to the privacy framework. The text also refers to assumptions of 
individuals about how their information will be used. P. 19 
 207. Id. 
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driven conception of privacy.208 He accurately predicted how, in 
an increasingly information-rich environment, there would be 
incremental encroachments on privacy that would consistently 
drive down expectations.209 For example, employees’ 
expectations of privacy slowly shrank each time employers so 
declared limitations – first in telephone conversations, then in 
e-mail communications, then in anything stored on one’s 
computer – to the point where there is virtually no expectation 
of privacy in the workplace today.210 Similarly, the third party 
doctrine diminished the expectation of privacy in any kind of 
information delivered to another person.211 Spencer described 
how individuals tend to internalize these successive 
encroachments and how, over time, the expectation keeps 
getting smaller and smaller.212 The cases discussed in the 
previous section illustrate Spencer’s point that, without a 
significant change in jurisprudence,213 the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard is on a downward spiral. The 
objective of reliable assumptions will suffer from the same 
spiral, and affect the fundamental nature of privacy 
assumptions, unless those applying the Privacy Framework 
avoid this pitfall. 
                                                            
 208. See generally Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the 
Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L.R. 843 (2002). 
 209. Id. at 857–58. In the absence of statutory protection for privacy, the 
standards rely almost exclusively on social norms. When there is legislation, 
often spurred by some event or some case, that legislation often serves to 
create or boost society’s expectation of privacy. For example, in the aftermath 
of the disclosure that a reporter in Washington, D.C. was able to obtain a copy 
of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork’s video rental history, a concerned 
group of Congressmen very quickly passed legislation to protect those – and 
their – records. The effect was to elevate the societal expectation of privacy in 
such records. Similarly, in the aftermath of the unpopular Olmstead decision 
(Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)), Congress amended the law 
to protect interception of telephone communications, thus creating a new 
expectation of privacy in such communications. 
 210. Id. at 860–62. 
 211. Id. at 860. 
 212. Id. at 863–66. 
 213. At the time this paper is written, Carpenter v. U.S. is pending a 
decision before the United States Supreme Court, a case in which discussions 
of differing views on the nature of expectations of privacy predominated. See 
Jeffrey Rosen, A Liberal-Conservative Alliance on the Supreme Court Against 
Digital Surveillance, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2017) 
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The second pitfall to be avoided in applying the 
predictability objective is that it will be difficult to measure 
reliable assumptions. When Solove describes the inexorable 
erosion of privacy expectations due to technology he identifies 
the role that courts play in “bootstrapping” the movement of 
expectations, and warns that “the government could condition 
the populace into expecting less privacy.”214 The application of 
a predictability standard to systems of information will suffer 
from the same weaknesses unless lessons can be learned from a 
comparison. 
There is a striking similarity between the dilemma of 
technology and reasonable expectation jurisprudence and data 
use and reliable assumptions under the goal of predictability. 
The court that applies the reasonable expectation of privacy to 
decide if the use of surveillance violates privacy rights, is 
analogous to the system operator and the determination of 
risks to privacy and whether the system use of data is 
predictable. In order to avoid a similar erosion of privacy, how 
the risk management approach to privacy215 is implemented is 
key. There are at least three lessons about reliable 
assumptions to be learned from this analysis. 
First, determination of assumptions is a multi-stakeholder 
process, but citizen vulnerabilities and potential data harms 
are the most difficult to assess and the most important for 
maintaining trust. Applying an objective view of predictability, 
including the circumstances and the context of the information 
system, but applying it in a systematic way, is important to 
establish reliability. Second, privacy engineering will be a 
catalyst for lowering the bar for assumptions of privacy, a 
bootstrapping exercise, unless care is taken to create a systems 
approach that lies outside of internal technical biases and third 
party pressures for access. Third, although data is collected in 
ever increasing amounts and in more fine-grained ways, 
similar to the march of surveillance technology, this fact alone 
should not be used as a basis for designing a system that 
incorporates the excesses. Numbness should not be equated 
with predictability. 
                                                            
 214. Solove, supra note 171, 1523–24. 
 215. A discussion of the implementation of a privacy risk management 
assessment is beyond the scope of this article, however, under the risk 
analysis, the definition of vulnerabilities and problematic data actions will be 
required. 
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In sum, implementation of the NIST Privacy Framework, 
in a sustainable and robust way, is likely not a desktop 
exercise. Engagement with stakeholders, evidence gathering, 
and protection from creeping liberalization of data sharing 
should be well recognized weaknesses that are watched and 
monitored. Otherwise, the trust that comes from reliable 
assumptions about the predictable way that information 
systems will be used will turn into cynicism about ways in 
which citizens are monitored or monetized in an administrative 
state or industry. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Julie Cohen correctly predicted that traditional 
values regarding “property,”216 “choice,”217 “knowledge,”218 and 
“speech”219 would make it very difficult to accommodate 
informational privacy rights. She argued that there was a need 
to incorporate protections that hold the data processing 
industry accountable.220 NIST privacy engineering may not be 
a perfect fit, but it is a step in that direction. Cohen argues that 
“we must use both technology and law” to address privacy 
threats.221 The Privacy Framework addresses Cohen’s 
admonition that “privacy consideration has not been uppermost 
in the [system] design process, but what is chosen can be 
changed.”222 The underlying philosophy of NIST’s approach is 
found in the privacy objectives, and the first objective, 
predictability, is at the crux of its success in protecting privacy 
in information systems. Lessons from comparisons to both the 
history and jurisprudence of patent nonobviousness, and the 
reasonable expectation of privacy, can increase the ultimate 
effectiveness of the Privacy Framework. 
In order for predictable systems to create trust and protect 
privacy, administrators should become adept at monitoring the 
gaps between old and new uses, and should avoid the hindsight 
bias of the kind that can plague review of patents for 
                                                            
 216. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the 
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nonobviousness. The emphasis, instead, should be placed on 
the prospective use of information, rather than on a 
retrospective analysis. To maintain reliable assumptions about 
how information will be used in a system, administrators 
should learn from the reasonable expectation of privacy 
jurisprudence that data use creep, like technology creep, can 
severely diminish privacy protection by small steps, that the 
Privacy Framework can contribute to the erosion of privacy by 
bootstrapping, by promoting assumptions that are defined in 
that very process; and lastly, that determining and 
maintaining predictable systems requires external interaction 
with stakeholders and longitudinal validation. 
Predictability of a system to protect privacy is a laudable 
goal, and one day may become as ingrained and successful as 
the goals in the Cybersecurity Framework. Predictability may 
help to support the Fair Information Privacy Practices by 
assessing and implementing purpose and use parameters, but 
much work is left to be done to define the concept so that it 
avoids the pitfalls of similar thorny areas. This is an era of 
increased pressure on government agencies to make the 
information in their systems widely available. While there may 
be benefits earned from increased data availability, there can 
nonetheless be a systemic loss of trust if personal information 
is later identified or used for different purposes. To avoid 
predictability being a hollow objective, agencies and voluntary 
adopters of the Privacy Framework should institute risk 
management approaches that consider whether the gap 
between old and potentially new uses is too wide, whether 
there is hindsight bias in their assessments, and if the very 
risk analysis that they perform is diminishing the assumptions 
that there is some personal information that should remain 
private. The Census Bureau is an example of an agency that 
recognizes the threats to trust that can result from information 
system leakage, and it could benefit from the insights into the 
Privacy Framework under this analysis. 
